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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper explores the importance of the determinants of happiness when assessing the case for 
international redistribution. It presents a different rationale for international redistribution with 
reference to the impact that absolute levels of income and relative levels of income exert on happiness. 
The case for redistribution is so strong that it exists even when citizens are envious of one another and 
malevolent toward one another. The importance of these two determinants of happiness is explored 
when assessing the case for redistribution between member states of the European Union. An analysis 
of the importance of these determinants in the European Union reveals that there is significant scope 
for further redistribution to increase happiness. An index of happiness is constructed and simulations 
are presented to shed insight into the role that governments might play in the pursuit of happiness.  
 
 
* The authors are Reader in Economics and Professors of Economics respectively in the 
Department of Economics and International Development at the University of Bath, UK. 
 
                                                 
1 We wish to acknowledge the helpful comments of the managing editor and also three 
anonymous referees which have substantially improved the paper. 
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 A Different Rationale for Redistribution:  
Pursuit of Happiness in the European Union2  
1. Introduction 
Beveridge (1942) stated that: “The object of government in peace and in war is not 
the glory of rulers or of races, but the happiness of the common man”.3 As Director of 
the London School of Economics he was the author of the report that inspired the 
extension of the UK welfare state and his prescription that government should focus 
on happiness is even more pertinent today with insight provided by a growing 
empirical literature on the determinants of happiness. The objective in this paper is to 
focus on some of the more robust findings in this literature (reviewed by Frey and 
Stutzer 2002a, 2002b) and to demonstrate how they might be used to inform policy 
designed to increase ‘the happiness of the common man’. 
One of the most  robust results is that “… it is not the absolute level of income that 
matters most but rather one’s position relative to other individuals” (Frey and Stutzer 
2005:124). This finding has already informed policy proposals. Frank (1997) and 
Layard (1980) argue that it implies that individuals spend ‘…too much’ time in 
income-earning activity (to acquire the resources necessary to finance 'conspicuous 
consumption'). They prescribe tax policy to correct the market failure that arises when 
individuals are locked in a counterproductive ‘acquisition race’. They advocate tax 
                                                 
2 We wish to acknowledge the helpful comments of the managing editor and also three anonymous 
referees which have substantially improved the paper. 
3 An echo  (22/5/06) of the sentiment has come from David Cameron, leader of the opposition 
Conservative Party in the UK, who stated: “It’s time we admitted that there’s more to life than money, 
and it’s time we focused not just on GDP, but on GWB – general well-being.” The pursuit of happiness 
may be an idea whose time has come. 
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 policy to reduce individuals’ incentive to expend effort on the acquisition of ever 
larger houses and ever more powerful motor cars. 
This paper focuses on the same empirical finding and on the observation that relative 
income and absolute income have a different impact on happiness at different stages 
of economic development. Above an absolute level of income per capita the relevance 
of absolute income as a determinant of happiness diminishes (Frey and Stutzer 2002b 
refer to an income of US$10,000 in 1995). One implication of these findings is that 
tax policy can be designed to correct market failure in high-income countries and 
redistribute revenue to individuals in low- income countries so that everyone’s 
happiness increases.  
The first section of the paper responds to Layard’s (2006) call for more theoretical 
analysis of the implications of these empirical results. The objective is to emphasise 
the relevance of these empirical findings for the likelihood that redistribution will 
increase happiness. When these findings apply, a rationale for redistribution can be 
premised on malevolence (rather than benevolence). Policy can be designed to 
redistribute income and the happiness of the common man increases even if the 
common man has no interest in the well-being of the recipients of this redistribution.  
 
Later sections of the paper focus on the relevance of the same empirical findings 
when exploring the impact of redistribution on happiness. If the empirical findings are 
so potent that they justify redistribution when individuals do not care about the 
recipients of redistribution, surely they are relevant when exploring the potency of 
redistribution more generally?  Later sections of the paper focus on a case study. If, 
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 within the European Union (EU), “…the aim of public policy should be to maximise 
people’s happiness suitably aggregated” (Layard 2005:147) what impact do these 
same empirical findings exert on the possibility that all may be made happier as a 
consequence of redistribution? What influence do they exert in simulations of the 
impact of redistribution on happiness in the EU? 
 
2. Can redistribution increase everyone’s happiness if individuals are 
malevolent? 
 
The objective in this section is to highlight the significance of recent findings in the 
empirical literature by demonstrating that everyone might be made better off if 
income is redistributed even if no one is motivated to act philanthropically.  The 
relevant empirical findings are that happiness is an increasing function of absolute and 
relative income but that relative income assumes greater importance at high levels of 
per capita income (Frey and Stutzer 2002b). These results are important when 
analysts explain why happiness indices do not show a clear upward trend over time 
despite steady increases in living standards (Blanchflower and Oswald, 2004a). In this 
section of the paper they are important when considering a quite different rationale for 
redistribution. 
 
The following analysis adapts earlier work by Brennan (1973) by including empirical 
findings concerning the importance of relative and absolute levels of income. Figure 1 
has been constructed to illustrate the impact of income on the happiness of individuals 
A and B ( who are citizens of a high-income country).  The income levels of two 
individuals A and B (assumed to have identical preferences) are recorded as YA and 
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 YB in Figure 1 (quadrant I). Their income level is connected to self-reported 
happiness4 (H) in Figure 1 (quadrant IV). If happiness depended only on absolute 
levels of income, A would prefer to be at point 1 in quadrant (I) to maximise 
happiness at point 1” in quadrant (IV). If A were at point 1 in quadrant (I ) self-
reported happiness would be h* ( for A would be at point 1’’ on Hi). As A and B are 
identical the analysis is symmetrical around the 45° line (point 1’ has the identical 
properties for individual B to point 1 for individual A). 
 
  Insert Figure 1 about here. 
 
The analysis changes if happiness also depends on relative income. The well being of 
individual A depends negatively on the income of individual B and vice versa. 
Citizens are envious and malevolent. The incentive (dominant strategy) is for both 
individuals to expend further effort in an ‘income race’. The Cournot-Nash reaction 
curves RA and RB describe how this race unfolds (as it documents the utility-
maximising reaction of each individual to the increased income of the other). The 
equilibrium found is the Nash non-cooperative one at point 2, where both A and B 
have incomes y2 and self-reported happiness level at point 2’ in Figure 1 (quadrant 
IV), namely, h1. This is read from the relation Hl, where it is assumed that both 
individuals are constrained to have identical incomes and hence Hl is drawn lower in 
self-reported happiness terms than Hi to reflect this.  
 
Point 2 puts individual A on indifference curve IA2 and individual B on indifference 
curve IB2 . These two curves contain an ellipse of Pareto-superior outcomes to point 2. 
                                                 
4 Which equates to actual happiness. 
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 These points are superior but paradoxically involve lower retained income. The 
contract or, more aptly in this case, conflict curve (Boulding’s terminology e.g. 1955) 
runs North West- South East from point 1’ to point 1 and a 'Nash bargaining-solution', 
based on fairness,5 would produce point 3 as the equilibrium. This will put individual 
A on indifference curve IA1 and individual B on indifference curve IB1 (indifference 
curves are labelled to indicate that the higher-numbered indifference curves are 
further away from bliss point, in this case from point 3)  
 
Layard (1980) argues that an income tax might resolve this problem and Frank (1997) 
calls for a progressive consumption tax. In this paper analysis also considers the way 
that tax revenue might be used. Figure 1 is designed to show how tax revenue might 
be redistributed internationally to increase happiness. In Figure 1 the ‘market failure’ 
problem in the high income country is solved by taxation so that there is revenue to 
redistribute to a third, poorer, party6.  Revenue is redistributed to individual C. 
Individual C is a citizen in a low-income country. With low income, C is not a 
member of A and B’s peer group (in this way C’s income is a ‘neutral good’ as far as 
A and B are concerned). 
 
C's initial income is y 1c (illustrated as one twelfth of y2) in Figure 1 (quadrant III) and 
self-reported happiness level is h 0C. If both individuals A and B transfer y1 – y2 to 
                                                 
5 This of course is an Hamada type construction which is drawn here such that reneging to respective 
reaction functions puts A and B on lower indifference curves than those associated with point 2 (so the 
threat to ‘not cooperate’ if one party tries to renege should be sufficient to secure compliance in the 
small numbers case). The bargain to this extent is self-enforcing. However generally, when numbers 
are large, free riding and a case for government redistribution can be predicted. 
 
6 There is evidence that the taxation system can be used in this way. Rogerson (2008), for example, 
argues that relative increases in taxes in Europe can explain much of the 45 percent decline in hours 
worked relative to the United States over the period 1956 to 2003. Moreover, and this is important, the 
elasticities are such that an increase in tax rates does tend to raise tax revenue6. 
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 individual C, then the ray 0’ – r in Figure 1 (quadrant II) (with angle 26.56°) shows 
how income is raised for individual C to y 2c. Research suggests the short and long run 
impact of this transfer will differ. With reference to Figure 1 (quadrant III) increasing 
short-run (unhabituated) happiness7 increases to point 4 on Hs (conditioned on y 1c as 
the initial income level) with happiness level h1c . This will later fall back to h 2c  on Hl 
at point 4’ as individual C becomes habituated to income level y 2c. Empirically this 
suggests a short run estimated impact that exceeds the long run one. The donors 
increase their happiness to point 3’ on Hl in Figure 1 (quadrant IV), with the self 
reported happiness level h2. Note C does not become as well off as A and B. As 
illustrated 2 y 2c = y 2 . For presentation purposes it is assumed that A and B are 
unconcerned with C as long as C does not have an income gross of transfers in excess 
of a given threshold.  
 
Figure 1 shows that happiness increases in the donor country and in the recipient 
country. However the rationale for redistribution depends on the envy that citizens in 
the high-income country have for each others’ income. When Booth (2007:9) surveys 
the empirical literature on the determinants of happiness he comments (almost 
‘tongue in cheek’) that “…policymakers have latched on to the apparent need to have 
a more even distribution of income to raise national happiness- something that many 
would regard as the legitimisation of envy…”. Here the analysis serves to legitimise 
envy as a rationale for redistribution. The important observation is that it is premised 
on the robust findings that both relative income and absolute levels of income are 
important determinants of happiness at different stages of economic development. 
                                                 
7 In the constructions dHs/dY > dHl/dY conditional on an inherited income level, say, y 1c initial 
income in Figure 1 (quadrant III) and generally it is assumed dH/dY >0 with d2H/dY2 < 0. 
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3. Happiness in the European Union:  A Case Study  
 
Section two of the paper focused on malevolence to emphasise the significance of the 
determinants of happiness as reported in a growing empirical literature. In this section 
the objective, more generally, is to consider the importance of these same variables 
when considering policy to increase happiness in the EU. As empirical relationships 
reported by empiricists are relevant when explaining the scope for redistributions, the 
objective is to focus on their importance when simulating the impact of redistribution 
on happiness in the EU. 
 
The analysis in section two of the paper was premised on the assumption that relative 
income and absolute income are important determinants of happiness and that the 
significance of absolute income falls as income per capita increases. This situation is 
consistent with the observation that absolute levels of income have a non-linear 
impact on happiness as income increases but relative income has a linear impact on 
happiness as income per capita increases. (Indeed, if the impact of relative income on 
wellbeing were driven by envy there would be no reason to suppose that this impact 
would lessen as income per capita increased). Of course the impact of absolute levels 
of income is likely to decline as income per capita increase because standard utility 
theory suggests that marginal utility diminishes as living standards increase. The first 
objective in this section of the paper is to explore the possibility that these 
relationships are relevant when explaining happiness in the EU.  
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 Before commencing on the empirical work it is important to acknowledge the 
criticism that might be made of such an approach. Critics have argued that it is 
difficult to rely on cardinal data on satisfaction but as Di Tella et al (2001) argue, such 
cardinal data does not behave so erratically and the welfare functions they imply are 
intuitive. Second, there is evidence that individuals in a ‘language community’ have a 
common understanding of how to translate internal feelings into a number scale (Van 
Praag, 1991) and here the objective is to compare citizens in different ‘language 
communities’. Once again, it is important to acknowledge this criticism but there is 
also evidence that individuals are able to recognize and predict satisfaction levels (in 
terms of happy, sad, jealous, etc.) of people from other cultural communities (Diener 
and Lucas, 1999). While it is important to recognise the difficulties of the approach 
that is to be pursed it is also important to stress that the following exercise makes 
comparisons between ‘representative’ individuals (i.e. not between two specific 
individuals, but representative of those in society as a whole).  
 
Notwithstanding these qualifications, how relevant are absolute levels of income and 
relative levels of income when explaining happiness and what insight do these 
relationships shed when simulating the impact of redistribution in the EU? 
   
 
3.1 Estimates of the Determinants of Happiness in the European Union  
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 The data employed are derived from the Eurobarometer survey carried out in 
April/May 2001 of the EU member countries and a second Eurobarometer survey8 
carried out in November/December 1999. These years were chosen as they provide a 
full data set on age, income, satisfaction and the other explanatory variables. This 
does not tend to be the case in more recent surveys, where income is often not given 
in as much detail as in these two surveys. The surveys cover the population of the 
respective nationalities of the EU member states aged fifteen years and over in each of 
the member states. The 2001 survey was carried out by INRA (EUROPE), a European 
Network of Market and Public Opinion Research agencies, and GIK Worldwide on 
request of the European Commission. The basic sample design is a multi stage, 
random probability one. The surveys are designed to be representative in terms of the 
distribution of the resident population of the respective EU nationalities in terms of 
metropolitan, urban and rural areas. All interviews were face to face, in people's 
homes and in the appropriate national language. The data collected from the earlier 
Eurobarometer survey was based on a similar sample design and was collected by 
INRA(EUROPE).  
 
The dependent variable represents responses to the question:  
      
      “On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied  
      or not at all satisfied with the life you lead? Would you say you are……?”  
 
                                                 
8 Eurobarometer data has been widely used in attitudinal research, including that related to subjective 
well being (e.g. Bjornskov, Gupta and Pedersen, 2008) . 
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 where possible responses were: (i) very satisfied (coded 4 in our analysis), (ii) fairly 
satisfied, (iii) not very satisfied and (iv) not at all satisfied (coded 1).9 A fifth 
possibility was “don’t know”.  
 
The responses are ordinal and ordered probit is used to estimate the data. The 
regression analysis excludes don’t knows and, of course, those who otherwise did not 
answer the question.10 Income was based on an income range relating to monthly 
household income, including state benefits before tax and other deductions. Absolute 
income was found by taking the midpoint of the income range as an indicator of the 
individual’s income.11
 
The data relating to satisfaction is summarized in Table 1. There are wide variations 
between countries; in general, the richer countries are more satisfied than the poorer 
countries. It is also evident that there has been a general downward shift comparing 
the two years with the sole exception of the Netherlands.  
                                                 
9 The potential problems with this measure (including the econometrics problems posed by 
measurement errors) are discussed in Frey and Stutzer (2002a). They conclude that the problems are 
reduced when they are used to estimate the relative determinants of happiness. 
 
10 This type of question has been used before in empirical work on well-being and happiness and in 
particular the Eurobarometer series has been used by (for example) Di Tella, MacCulloch and Oswald 
(2001). The analysis involves the assumption that we can imply a cardinal interpretation to the 
subjective, qualitative responses to the question proxying well-being. 
 
11 This is not unusual in this type of analysis, indeed any research which uses Eurobarometer data e.g. 
has to make similar calculations. It would be better to have more exact measures of income as in the 
European Community Household Panel (ECHP), but this is not available and the ECHP, e.g., does not 
have data on wellbeing per se, but rather wellbeing relating specifically to work, finance, housing and 
lesiure. 
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 Table 1: Country Scores on Happiness 
 
    2001     1999   2001  1999 
 
Austria 2.09     2.33  Italy  1.92  2.03 
Belgium 2.06     2.12  Luxembourg 2.29  2.40 
Denmark 2.58     2.75  Netherlands 2.42  2.41 
Finland 2.11     2.24  Portugal 1.63  1.74 
France  1.91     2.04  Spain  2.02  2.05 
Germany 1.90     2.04  Sweden 2.37  2.42 
Greece 1.50     1.98  UK  2.20  2.25 
Ireland  2.22         2.30 
 
Source: Data derived from Eurobarometer Surveys in 1999 and 2001. The 'score' is the mean when the 
happiness question defined in the appendix is coded zero for not at all satisfied, one for not very 
satisfied, etc. Hence a score of 2 corresponds to an average response of 'fairly satisfied'. 
 
 
Existing research already sheds insight on variables that are likely to prove 
significant. These are:  
i)    relative income;  
ii)  GDP per capita in the different member countries;  
iii)  age;  
iv)  gender;  
v)  education; 12
vi) dummy variables for those unemployed and those where the primary earner in the 
household (if other than the respondent) is unemployed;  
vii) dummy variables representing marital state; 13
viii) variables which reflect overall improvements in life. 14
                                                 
12 The education level was included in log form to allow for possible non-linearities. 
13 One for those who are divorced, one for those separated from a partner who they were not married 
to, one for those widowed, and one for those who are alone and have never lived with a partner or been 
married. The default case is therefore "married". 
14 The first asks about whether the respondents “situation” has improved or worsened over the last five 
years (two years in the 1999 survey) and the second asks about expectations relating to the future over 
the same time horizon as the retrospective question. 
 13
 Absolute income is measured at the midpoint of the income range (as an indicator of 
an individuals’ income); relative income is the ratio of this to the average. GDP per 
capita refers to the country in which a respondent is resident in the same year as the 
survey. 15 Variables are defined in the Appendix. 
 
The assumption is made that there is an underlying response variable Wi, measuring 
life well-being along a continuum, and linked to the individual's socio-economic and 
country characteristics (Xi): 
 
Wi = g(Xi)       (1) 
 
Satisfaction or happiness (Y*i ) is a function of well-being relative to some aspiration 
level Wia: 
 
Y*i = h(Wi - Wia) = f(Xi) + ui                (2) 
 
Wia  itself may be a function of the individual's socio-economic characteristics and 
particularly from country to country may depend upon GDP per capita and also 
relative income.16  f(Xi) encapsulates this combined relationship. These points are 
returned to below. The socio-economic variables impact on well being through 
equation (1). Satisfaction is then based on a comparison of well being and aspirations 
via equation (2). The direct impact of an increase in the socio-economic variables is to 
                                                 
 
15 The figures, which are taken from World Development Indicators, are in US$10,000 adjusted for 
purchasing power parity. As with relative income the results are robust with respect to other 
specifications for GDP per capita. 
16 Easterlin (2001) suggests that over the life cycle aspirations will grow with income. 
 14
  15
                                                
raise well being and it is through the impact of this on satisfaction that people 
perceive an increase in satisfaction. 
 
The i'th individual's response to the question will depend on the value of Yi*. The 
survey data has m possible responses corresponding to m+1 extended real numbers, 
α0, α1, …, αm. Defining α0 = -∞ and αm = +∞ and αj > αj-1 ∀j the individual will 
respond in the j'th category if: 
 
αj-1 < Y*i < αj        (3) 
 
Personality factors may enter in one of three ways. First in intervening between the 
socio-economic characteristics and well-being, second in the formulation of an 
aspirational level and third in h(.) the function transforming the individual’s relative 
well-being into satisfaction or happiness.17 Because the data is ordered it is natural to 
use ordered probit to estimate f(Xi). The regression estimates are also clustered at 
country level to take account of intra-group correlation.  
 
 
 
 
17 Strictly speaking only the third possibility unambiguously results in different functional forms for 
different individuals. This possibility is deserving of further analysis with a data set which includes 
information on ‘personality’. 
 Table 2: Cross Section Results: All Countries 
 
      2001 Data Base                           1999 Data Base    Pooled Data Base 
Equation  (2.1)    (2.2)  (2.3)   (2.4)   (2.5)   (2.6)   (2.7)   (2.8)   (2.9)  (2.10)  
Gender  0.0679*  0.0593*  0.1158**  0.0286  0.0213  0.0495  0.0494*  0.0417*  0.0834** 0.0295  
  (2.27)  (2.00)  (3.98)  (1.05)  (0.87)  (1.92)  (1.99)  (1.98)  (3.83)  (1.31) 
Age  -0.0199** -0.0175*  -0.0288*  -0.0314** -0.0244**  -0.0199*   -0.0254**  -0.0211**  -0.0231* -0.0130* 
  (3.18)  (2.54)  (2.30)  (5.11)  (4.65)  (2.40)  (4.62)  (4.12)  (2.50)  (2.41) 
Age2  0.00028** 0.00027** 0.00040**  0.00033** 0.00028**  0.00020  0.00030** 0.00027** 0.00029** 0.00019** 
  (4.42)  (3.65)  (2.86)  (5.41)  (5.00)  (1.94)  (5.64)  (4.99)  (2.63)  (3.15) 
Life Improved 0.5946** 0.6171**  0.6384**  0.3153**  0.3343**  0.3248**  0.4619**  0.4807**  0.4844** 0.4786** 
  (12.34)  (12.96)  (12.40)  (11.76)  (12.58)  (10.58)  (16.78)  (17.58)  (15.26)  (17.45) 
Will Improve 0.0777  0.0966*  0.0618  0.0537  0.0574  0.0313  0.0795  0.087  0.059  0.0857 
  (1.93)  (1.96)  (1.18)  (1.26)  (0.92)  (0.43)  (1.70)  (1.50)  (0.92)  (1.50) 
Always single -0.0798  -0.1063  -0.1199  -0.0952** -0.1452**  -0.1327** -0.0926**  -0.1281**  -0.1279** -0.1113** 
  (1.44)  (1.70)  (1.81)  (2.66)  (3.25)  (3.23)  (2.96)  (3.00)  (3.03)  (2.83) 
Single after  -0.2598** -0.2449**  -0.2326**  -0.243**  -0.1809**  -0.18**  -0.2479**  -0.2074**  -0.2018** -0.1819** 
partner      (3.64)  (3.49)  (2.87)  (4.48)  (3.46)  (3.59)  (5.52)  (4.07)  (3.60)  (3.35) 
Divorced  -0.3574** -0.3915**  -0.3843**  -0.3744** -0.4196**  -0.4194** -0.3645**  -0.4022**  -0.4008** -0.3788** 
  (6.41)  (6.90)  (6.26)  (6.70)  (6.20)  (6.55)  (7.83)  (7.64)  (7.44)  (7.58) 
Widowed  -0.2684** -0.3076**  -0.254**  -0.2208*  -0.2594**  -0.2736  -0.2439**  -0.2825**  -0.2608* -0.2495** 
  (4.53)  (5.03)  (2.87)  (2.22)  (3.11)  (1.57)  (3.52)  (4.70)  (2.37)  (4.07) 
Log    0.1173** 0.2267**  0.2048**  0.0191  0.2269*  0.2167*  0.0727**  0.2357**  0.2217** 0.2737** 
Education  (3.82)  (3.87)  (3.76)  (0.54)  (2.25)  (2.10)  (4.81)  (3.15)  (3.06)  (3.86) 
Professional 0.0147  0.0568  0.0631  0.1143  0.1255  0.1538  0.0701  0.0914  0.1053  0.1636* 
  (0.24)  (0.71)  (0.67)  (1.48)  (1.43)  (1.54)  (1.41)  (1.36)  (1.42)  (2.47) 
High   0.2706** 0.1858*  0.2609**  0.2725**  0.1921  0.2702*  0.2712**  0.1808**  0.2575** 0.2688** 
Management (2.76)  (2.44)  (3.10)  (2.87)  (1.68)  (2.34)  (5.69)  (3.38)  (3.97)  (5.97) 
Middle   0.0507  0.1127  0.1339  0.0992*  0.1231*  0.1336*  0.0736  0.12*  0.1359** 0.1846** 
Management (0.93)  (1.60)  (1.74)  (2.07)  (2.37)  (2.15)  (1.82)  (2.51)  (2.66)  (4.40) 
Farmer  -0.2039* -0.2247**  -0.2074*  0.021  0.1376  0.1184  -0.0754  -0.0322  -0.0313  -0.0589 
  (2.36)  (2.61)  (2.20)  (0.26)  (1.22)  (0.82)  (1.66)  (0.44)  (0.39)  (0.83) 
Unemployed -0.3244** -0.3372**  -0.3357**  -0.4035** -0.4855**  -0.4838** -0.3722**  -0.4186**  -0.4154** -0.4797** 
  (3.67)  (3.18)  (3.08)  (4.20)  (4.29)  (4.14)  (4.41)  (4.08)  (3.99)  (4.81) 
Main earner -0.1062  -0.1851  -0.2013  -0.264  -0.3409*  -0.3824*  -0.2154  -0.2695  -0.3014* -0.2941* 
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unemployed (0.78)  (1.29)  (1.38)  (1.61)  (2.07)  (2.19)  (1.52)  (1.84)  (1.99)  (1.99) 
Relative  0.3944** 0.219*  0.2492*  0.5143**  0.2668  0.2767  0.4504**  0.2485  0.2701*  0.3114** 
Income  (6.94)  (1.99)  (2.43)  (4.98)  (1.48)  (1.80)  (6.51)  (1.85)  (2.53)  (6.13) 
Relative  -0.0686** -0.0218  -0.0312  -0.0984** -0.0315  -0.0344  -0.0817**  -0.0278  -0.0342  -0.0356* 
Income2  (3.21)  (0.47)  (0.76)  (2.78)  (0.47)  (0.57)  (3.13)  (0.52)  (0.76)  (2.09) 
GDP per       2.41**  2.184**       2.166**  1.932**        2.011**  1.806**  1.958** 
capita      (5.11)  (4.14)       (3.07)  (2.73)        (4.47)  (3.87)  (4.42) 
GDP per     -0.3178** -0.2848**      -0.3298**  -0.289*       -0.2672**  -0.2363** -0.2596** 
capita2      (4.70)  (3.80)       (2.64)  (2.30)        (3.95)  (3.39)  (3.91) 
2001 dummy             -0.262**  -0.5255**  -0.5274** -0.5195** 
              (5.87)  (6.98)  (6.49)  (6.92) 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 
        LL   -8516 -8863 -6619 -8165 -8612 -6490         -16797       -17572         -13191  -17534 
        Pseudo R2 0.17 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.08 0.08           0.15           0.11            0.11  0.11 
        N 9849 9849 7421 9668 9668 7379 19517       19517         14800  19517 
        ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
**/*denotes significance at the 1%/5% levels of significance respectively. (.) denotes t statistic. Equations 2.3 and 2.6 were estimated  
with respondents over 60 excluded from the sample. N denotes the number of observations, LL the log likelihood. Regressions, estimated in STATA,  
are clustered at country level to take account of intra-group correlation. 
 The results are shown in Table 2. They are largely consistent with other studies that 
estimate the determinants of happiness (see, e.g. Di Tella, MacCulloch and Oswald, 
2001; Hudson, 2006; Diener et al., 2000 and Erhardt, Saris and Veenhoren, 2000). 
The first columns relate to 2001. Column one shows the results when including 
country dummy variables.18  
 
Education tends to increase happiness and, in common with several other studies, 
women tend to be happier than men (e.g., Clark and Oswald, 1994). Happiness has a 
nonlinear relationship with age and is adversely affected by being unemployed or 
having lost a partner.19  
 
The results also indicate a positive impact of increasing relative income on happiness, 
although there is limited evidence of significant non-linearity. This is not great and 
hence there is only weak evidence that redistribution policies within a country can 
substantially increase average happiness. In subsequent regressions this evidence 
becomes smaller still. This point is discussed further below. Being unemployed is also 
a significant cause of unhappiness, although interestingly enough this does not extend 
to the principal earner in the family, when that is not the respondent, being 
unemployed.20
 
                                                 
18 These are not reported in this table although discussed subsequently. 
 
19 There are diverse ways to lose a partner but the one which causes greatest distress is divorce. Thus 
becoming widowed for example would appear to reduce happiness by less than half the unhappiness 
caused by divorce. This is also the case with the separation of couples who were not legally married. 
This strongly suggests that it is the legal aspects of the divorce process which adds to unhappiness in 
addition to that caused by the loss of a partner. 
20 Others’ unemployment will impact upon income which is already controlled for. Hence, this result, 
together with the significance of self-unemployment, suggests that there are costs, possibly psychic or 
health costs, to being unemployed which are unique to the individual and which are in addition to the 
associated lack of income. 
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 When country dummy variables are plotted against GDP per capita there appears to 
be a non-linear relationship as can be seen from Figure 2.  Even without the two 
outliers, Denmark and Luxembourg, there is evidence of a nonlinear relationship 
confirmed by a regression with these two countries included and also excluded, on the 
remaining thirteen observations. In a sense the outlier is Denmark with a very large 
positive fixed effect. In interpreting this it must be recalled that these country dummy 
variables will be picking up much more than just differences in GDP per capita. As 
this is also consistent with results in other studies, this regression was repeated with 
GDP per capita and GDP per capita squared replacing the dummy variables21. The 
results are reported in column 2. The significance of the socio-economic variables is 
largely unchanged and both the GDP per capita terms are very significant at the 1% 
level. The signs indicate a strong nonlinearity and suggest that there are gains from 
policies which redistribute wealth between countries - a result in keeping with the 
discussion of section 2. In this regression the evidence for within country 
redistribution effects disappears, i.e. the coefficient on relative income squared is 
insignificant. The main change between this regression and the previous one is the 
reduced significance of relative income22 and in particular the absence of any 
evidence for nonlinearity. This suggests that in the absence of country fixed effects, 
the distribution of relative income is reflecting some country characteristics, possibly 
inequality, which impact on wellbeing.     
 
                                                 
21 They cannot be both included as the two GDP per capita variables are perfectly correlated with the 
country fixed effects. As a consequence, if we were to include GDP per capita and the country fixed 
effects in the same regressions, the latter would have to be omitted for two countries and the results 
vary substantially depending upon which two are omitted.  
22 This is not to say however that it is important and the variations in happiness across the relative 
income range are substantially more than over the age range shown in Figure 3. 
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 Turning to data collected in November-December 1999 the results in Table 2 are 
similar to those already discussed. In particular, the coefficients on GDP per capita 
suggest that happiness increases with aggregate living standards, but at a declining 
rate23. Both sets of results include everyone aged eighteen or over and to focus more 
clearly on those of workable age the regressions were repeated with those over sixty 
excluded. These results are shown in equations 2.3 and 2.6. Again the results are 
largely similar. It has been suggested that the relationship between age and happiness 
follows a U shaped distribution, with happiness declining until some 
point
-1
-.5
0
.5
1
C
ou
nt
ry
 F
ix
ed
 E
ffe
ct
s
10000 20000 30000 40000 50000
GDP per capita in US$
country fixed effects obtained from regression 2.7 in Table 2
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Figure 2 Country fixed effects and GDP per capita
 
 
in early middle age and then increasing (Blanchflower and Oswald, 2004b). To test 
for this, age and age squared are included. Evidence for the U-shaped pattern is 
strong. In the 2001 equation the trough of happiness is reached at about 36 years and 
                                                 
23 Other research confirms this and it is one of the more established results in this literature that at the 
upper end increases in GDP per capita have little impact on happiness.  
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 in the 1999 equation at about 48 years. These are substantial differences, although it 
must be emphasised that the results are not significantly different and that these 
estimates are sensitive to relatively small changes in the parameter estimates of the 
two age coefficients.  
 
In columns 2.7-2.10 the pooled results are shown. These are largely similar to those 
for the separate years, although a dummy variable operative for the 2001 sample is 
significant at the 1% level in all three regressions and indicates that some factors not 
included in the regression impacted upon people to reduce their wellbeing in the more 
recent year.  Table 3 shows the country dummy variables from the regression in 
column 2.7. These indicate wellbeing relative to Finland, other things being equal and 
ignoring GDP per capita. On this basis people living in Greece and Portugal are the 
unhappiest and Denmark and Sweden the happiest. Figure 3 shows the age estimated 
impact curve on happiness, normalised to begin at the average value for predicted 
happiness from this pooled regression. The critical values dividing not very satisfied 
and fairly satisfied and fairly satisfied and very satisfied are -0.43 and 1.55 
respectively. Hence age changes are not sufficient to move this representative 
individual between categories, but for some individuals this would be the case.  
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Once more, relative income has a linear impact in the equation with GDP per capita 
replacing the country fixed effects, but when we use country fixed effects relative 
income squared is significant indicating such a nonlinearity. However, the curve is 
such that the nonlinearity for relative income is substantially less than that for GDP 
per capita and only relevant at the highest levels of relative income. Thus the 
regression is repeated excluding just the 500 individuals with the highest relative 
income. In this case the coefficient on income squared is insignificant at even the 10% 
level of significance24. Hence, it would appear that only for the very richest people in 
a country does the relative income impact flatten out, for the rest of the population it 
is nonlinear and thus, as with the regression with GDP per capita, supports this 
reliance on the findings discussed earlier.  
 
                                                 
24 This is only 2.5% of the sample. There are several reasons why this might be the case. For example, 
following Friedman’s permanent income hypothesis, those at the top of the income scale are likely to 
have positive transitory income, with actual income in excess of their permanent income. If it is the 
latter which impacts on wellbeing n relative terms, this would explain this result. 
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 Finally, in 2.10 regression 2.8 is repeated but with relative income defined in an 
alternative way. There is a literature which suggests that relative income comparisons 
should be done with similar individuals. As a consequence, the log of income is 
regressed on age, age squared, gender, education, occupational status, employment 
status and country dummy variables. A predicted value for each income given these 
characteristics is obtained  and a relative income measure as the ratio to this predicted 
variable is computed. The results in column 2.10 show this to be slightly better than 
the previous definition of relative income and although nonlinearities are now more 
strongly suggested they are still not significant in terms of the coefficient on the 
squared term. Although interesting in its own right, the policy implications are limited 
as it is difficult to envisage a general redistribution of income on the basis of socio-
economic characteristic, e.g. redistributing income between women, but not from men 
to women.   
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 Table 3: Country dummy variables from Regression 2.7 in Table 2 
 
Country Coefficient t statistic Country Coefficient t statistic 
 
Belgium -0.0791   7.88 Italy -0.3724 29.76 
Denmark   1.0540 64.38 Luxembourg  0.2520 18.17 
Germany -0.2721 22.05 Netherlands   0.3815 28.52 
Greece           -0.7216 36.16 Portugal -0.8027 30.33 
Spain -0.2992 24.12 UK   0.0603   8.82 
France -0.3476 28.12 Austria  0.1208 13.38 
Ireland  0.1754 23.84 Sweden  0.3759 30.53 
 
Note: these show differences in happiness of people in different countries relative to people  
living in Finland, other characteristics being equal and omitting GDP per capita.  
 
 
3.3 An Index of Happiness: Policy Simulations  
 
Equations 2.2. and 2.5 can be employed to calculate indices of happiness. From 
equation 2, predicted values from regressions are continuous measures of predicted 
happiness. They indicate how happy the i'th individual should be given their socio-
economic circumstances and those of their country. The happiness (or satisfaction) of 
the average individual can be calibrated with reference to these characteristics.25  
 
It is not a unique measure; any linear transformation of the measure is equally valid. 
In choosing such a transformation it is first assumed that there are lower and upper 
bounds on happiness of 0 and 100 respectively.26 The lower bound of zero is found by 
calculating the value of Y* in the "worst case scenario", e.g. a divorced man, with an 
income equal to one tenth of the average with country per capita income of $10,000. 
                                                 
25 This is an important point, and in part meets the criticism of those who argue that we cannot compare 
happiness between individuals. In calculating expected or average happiness for an individual with a 
set of socio-economic characteristics we allow for possible personality, or other, differences resulting 
in one individual being happier than another with an identical set of objective and measurable 
characteristics. 
26 Changing the upper bound makes no significant difference to the measure we calculate, it is the 
lower bound of zero which is critical. Thus for example, if we changed the upper bound to 1000, this 
would only have the effect of multiplying all values in the index by 10. 
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 Similarly the upper bound is calculated by assuming a "best case scenario" of a 
married woman who is not unemployed, aged 6027 and with relative income five 
times the average and a per capita country income equal to the optimum implied by 
the nonlinearity of the two regression coefficients on GDP per capita and GDP per 
capita squared. The worst case scenario equates to zero on the happiness index and 
the best case scenario to 100. This allows the calculation of a unique linear 
transformation of the predicted value of happiness for each individual in the sample. 
In the case of the 2001 data set it is: 
 
*ˆ25.1722.26 ii YH +=        (4) 
and for the 1999 data set: 
*ˆ29.2294.6 ii YH +=        (5) 
 
The difference between the two transformations is not unexpected, as the measure of 
 in all cases is only unique subject to a linear transformation and is likely to differ 
from one data set to another. The main purpose of this transformation is to achieve a 
clear understanding in relative terms of average happiness and how it varies across the 
population. It will also facilitate a more easy evaluation of the impact of 
redistribution. It should not be used to compare shifts over time.  
*
iˆY
 
Table 4 shows the mean value of this index, for the 2001 sample, to be 66.32 and to 
vary from 23.91 to 93.16. The standard deviation is also shown. It is now possible to 
proceed with a number of simulations which estimate the impact upon happiness of 
                                                 
27  60 as people older than this are tending to cease working and hence to receive lower levels of 
income 
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 different scenarios. Again these scenarios pick up the predicted change in happiness 
of the average individual with a given set of socio-economic characteristics. The 
regression analysis suggested that short term events have a considerable impact on 
happiness via the impact of the variables reflecting whether circumstances had 
changed in past years or were expected to change in the future, with the influence of 
the past being stronger than that of expectations of the future28. It is possible to find 
an estimate of long-run or underlying well-being by assuming that for everyone the 
response to these two questions is 'no-change'. The results indicate that long-run well-
being is some 4.6% less than in the short run - the habituation effect.29 This indicates 
that shocks to individuals are mostly positive, enhancing satisfaction rather than 
reducing it. This is intuitive as for a long period during their lives individuals tend to 
enhance their status and position as they age through promotion, moving house, 
marriage, etc. However, if it were possible to negate the impact of negative shocks 
then it can be seen that well-being would increase by the order of 1.6% to 2.9%. It 
could be argued that it is wrong to adopt a cardinal interpretation of the reported past 
and expected changes in life circumstances and that this therefore does not permit an 
analysis of the habituation effect. Nonetheless, we would make a similar argument to 
that of Di Tella et al (2001) in that these results are highly significant and at the least 
strongly suggest that changes in past, and to an extent future, circumstances impact on 
well being. 
                                                 
28 This is consistent with van Praag and Frijters’ (1999) conclusion that, in addition to current income, 
the influence of past income was stronger than that of future income on well-being. 
 
29 It is important to stress that the magnitude of this effect is similar to that found if the untransformed 
predicted values from the regression are taken. Although it is also possible that this could be due to 
some other characteristic that is not measured. 
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 Table 4: Estimated Index of Happiness and Redistribution 
 
 Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
Comparison           
with base 
2001       
Basic  65.60 11.14 23.63 92.38 100.00  
Long run 62.60 7.02 33.59 83.18 95.43  
Country equality 65.70 10.73 25.92 90.38 100.15  
EU equality 66.78 9.37 34.52 90.63 101.80  
No adverse shocks 67.50 9.07 33.59 92.38 102.90  
Increased education 66.33 10.76 26.33 92.38 101.11  
        
1999            
Basic  66.28 10.50 24.89 91.06 100.00  
Long run 64.43 8.82 28.31 86.90 97.20  
Country equality 66.48 9.77 27.84 91.20 100.30  
EU equality 67.38 8.39 30.89 87.50 101.66  
No adverse shocks 67.26 9.69 29.60 91.33 101.47  
Increased education 67.19 9.97 24.92 91.06 101.37  
Note: These are calculated from the predicted values of equations 2.2 and 2.5 transformed using 
equations (4) and (5) respectively. The redistribution simulations have taken into consideration the 
populations of the countries and hence are feasible redistributions. 
 
 
It is now possible to consider the impact of redistribution. The coefficients on GDP 
per capita in equations 2.2 and 2.4 provide support for the hypotheses that happiness 
increases with GDP per capita but at a declining rate. People in richer countries may 
be happier than those in poorer countries for at least two reasons. First, living in a 
richer country implies that, given the individual's relative income the greater will be 
their personal standard of living. Second, it is probable that people in richer countries 
enjoy a higher standard of public services and public goods (Hudson 2006). But the 
important point is that the impact of relative income is linear and hence as long as the 
redistribution from rich to poor country preserves the ranking in the former, its impact 
on welfare will be linked to that on GDP per capita. The nature of the coefficients 
suggests that people could be made happier on average by redistributing income. A 
result that is consonant with the analysis of section 2. The same is much less true with 
respect to relative income within a country. There is relatively little evidence that on 
average redistribution policies within countries in the EU increase average happiness. 
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 Again a result that is consistent with section 2. This is evident from Table 4 which 
shows, as must be expected given the regression results, little impact on happiness of 
within country redistribution but that between country redistribution increases 
happiness by 1.8% on average in 2001 and by about 2.2% in 1999. In both cases of 
course the variance of happiness falls substantially. In addition, the well-being of the 
worst-off person in the sample increases by 46% in 1999 and 30%in 2001. The much 
smaller effect from introducing within country equality is a reflection of the relatively 
limited evidence for nonlinearity in the impact of this variable. The simulations also 
show the impact of increasing the education of those with the lowest level to the next 
level. The impact in 1999 would be to raise well-being by an estimated 3.0%, and in 
2001 by 1.0%.30  With all the reservations that have been made about the welfare 
connotations associated with estimates of happiness, this result offers a clear estimate 
(and way forward) where neo-classical welfare economics is unable to proceed. 
 
Table 5 shows the impact of redistribution upon the constructed index of happiness 
across the EU countries. Between individual countries there are sharp differences 
amongst the winners and losers, the former of course tend to be the relatively poorer 
countries within the EU. Because of the nonlinearity of the impact of income on 
wellbeing the losses of even the richest countries are relatively smaller and this is the 
extreme case of redistribution, less ambitious redistribution implies smaller losses. 
These losses are what need to be compensated for by the impacts on welfare from (i) 
                                                 
30The fact that the estimated impact differs between the two samples would of course be expected even 
if the true parameter value was constant over time. However it may not be, the impact of education 
may depend upon the state of the world and the problems individuals have to deal with and the 
opportunities which are open to them. In addition, the impact can be expected to change over time as 
technology evolves and changes the nature of the production function between activities and happiness. 
For instance the impact of the growth of television may be to facilitate the happiness of the less 
educated, who may be less able to enjoy more traditional cultural activities, more than the better 
educated. 
 
 28
 malice and envy and (ii) possible reduced time spent working in order for there to be 
no reduction in wellbeing for the richer countries.  
 
Table 5: Country Impacts of EU Redistribution 
  
   2001    1999 
  Before After Change  Before After Change 
 
Austria  68.42    65.88 -2.54  66.21 62.87 -3.34 
 Belgium 70.12 66.30 -3.82  65.20 61.35 -3.85 
 Denmark 72.95 69.31 -3.64  68.82 64.87 -3.95 
 Germany 65.31 64.74 -0.57  62.62 61.29 -1.33 
 Greece  51.18 64.25 +13.07  48.22 63.46 +15.2 
 Finland  67.44 67.35 -0.09  63.55 64.16 +0.61 
 France  67.61 67.38 -0.23  64.12 63.59 -0.53 
 Ireland  72.84 69.86 -2.98  59.03 63.41 +4.38 
 Italy   66.36 67.49 +1.13  61.00 62.41 +1.41 
 Luxembourg 73.42 70.09 -3.33  71.90 64.73 -7.17 
 Netherlands 71.88 70.12 -1.76  67.96 65.67 -2.29 
 Portugal 50.72 65.11 +14.39  47.10 62.74 +15.64 
 Spain  59.75 68.08 +8.33  52.56 62.30 +9.74 
 Sweden 69.61 70.25 +0.64  64.04 65.31 +1.25 
 UK  67.38 68.32 +0.94  62.09 63.27 +1.18 
 
Note: These are calculated from the predicted values of equations 2.2 and 2.5 transformed  
using equations (4) and (5) respectively. The 'after' results are calculated by  
redistributing income within the EU countries so that they all have the same level of GDP  
per capita. 
 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
This paper set out to achieve two objectives. The first was to assess the relevance of 
specific empirical findings when exploring a different rationale for redistribution.  
The second was to consider the relevance of the same empirical findings when 
simulating the impact of redistribution on happiness in the EU.  
 
The first conclusion is that specific findings reported in an empirical literature 
describe a world in which redistribution might increase everyone’s happiness even if 
individuals are malevolent! The observations that both relative income and absolute 
income determine happiness describe a world in which redistribution from malevolent 
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 citizens in high-income countries to individuals in low-income countries can increase 
the happiness of all concerned. This conclusion is possible because the happiness 
citizens in high-income countries derive, when seeing the income of their fellow 
citizens fall, more than compensates for the loss of happiness they experience when 
their income is taxed. If tax revenue is then distributed to citizens in the low -income 
country (where absolute levels of income have a bigger impact on happiness) 
everyone’s happiness increases31. Empirical studies of the determinants of happiness 
(and results reported in this study)give substance to Brennan’s (1973) paradoxical 
rationale for redistribution. 
 
Of course this analysis is very specific but it has quite general implications. If tax 
policy can be designed to correct the market failure that is created by ‘excessive’ 
involvement in an ‘acquisition race’ (Frank 1997, Layard 2006), there is scope to 
increase everyone’s happiness if revenues are redistributed to citizens in low- income 
countries.  
 
Turning to the second objective in this paper it is clear that the same empirical 
findings have resonance when analysing the impact of redistribution on happiness. 
Analysis of the determinants of happiness in the EU focussed on linearity, when 
analysing the impact that relative income on happiness exerts as income levels 
increased, and non-linearity, when analysing the impact that GDP per capita exerts as 
income levels increase. With evidence that this relationship is relevant, it is more 
likely (other things equal) that redistribution from high to low income countries will 
increase happiness.  
                                                 
31 Hence this should reduce any political problems which may surround such a program. 
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The simulations of redistribution in the EU are consistent with this proposition. In the 
reported simulation not everyone was made happier but the increase in happiness to 
those who gained outweighed the loss in happiness to those who lost32. These 
simulations are relevant when considering net contributions made to the EU budget. 
This general approach offers insight if specific financing arrangements are to be 
rationalised. It offers insight to policymakers if the objective is to explore the impact 
that alternative tax and expenditure policies of the EU budget have on happiness in 
member states.  
 
The overarching conclusion (in both theoretical and empirical sections of the paper) is 
that analysis is sensitive to the behavioural assumptions on which it is premised. If  
Lord Beveridge commends policy ‘to increase the happiness of the common man’ 
there is even greater scope for government intervention. Echoing the words of the US 
Declaration of Independence, this paper suggests that a ‘participative – protective –
redistributive – educative – state’ can be part of the ‘pursuit of happiness’. 
                                                 
32 In addition these calculations do not take account of the reduction in work effort in richer countries 
and the corresponding increase in happiness of individuals in these countries. 
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 APPENDIX: DATA DEFINITIONS 
Happiness: Responses to a question which asked: “Now lets talk about the quality of 
life. Please tell me whether you are very satisfied (coded 4 in our analysis), fairly 
satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all satisfied (coded 1) with ….. your life in 
general?" A fifth possibility  “don’t know” was excluded from the regression analysis.  
 
Gender:  male=0, female=1. 
 
Age: The age, in years, of the respondent. 
 
Life Improved (Retrospective Changes in Happiness): For the 1999 survey: those 
who in comparing their current position with two years ago were:  more satisfied, (3), 
no change (2) or less satisfied (1) with their lives in general. In the 2001 survey the 
time horizon was five years. 
 
Will Improve (Expected Changes in Happiness): For the 1999 survey: as with 
retrospective changes in happiness but with respect to expectations covering the next 
two years. In the 2001 survey the time horizon was five years. 
 
Education Age at which the individual finished full time education  Coded: 1, <16 
years; 2 16-19 years; 3 >19 years.   
 
Relative income: The ratio of household income to average income in the 
respondent's country. The data on income is based on a fifteen point scale and to 
proxy income the mid point value of the range corresponding to the individual's point 
on the scale was taken. 
 
Single/Single after partner/Divorced/Widowed: binary variables operative for those 
who were either single, single having previous lived with partner, divorced/separated 
or widowed. The default case is therefore those who are married or living with 
partner. 
 
Farmer/Professional binary variables taking a value of one if the individual was a 
farmer/professional (where a professional is defined as lawyer, medical practitioner, 
accountant, architect, etc 
 
High/Middle Management takes a value of 1 if the individual  was a director or 
in top management for High Management and middle management or other 
management (department head, junior manager, teacher, technician) for Middle 
management. 
 
Unemployed/Main Earner Unemployed binary variables taking a value of either the 
individual or the family's principal earner (if not the respondent) were unemployed. 
GDP per capita: GDP per capita in the country where the respondent is living in the 
year of the Eurobarometer survey. The figures are in US$10,000 adjusted for 
purchasing power parity, Source: World Development Indicators. 
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